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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In a context of massive 
reductions in government consumption 
spending, the National Lottery is 
intended to provide a sustainable source 
of funding for non-profit organisations 
providing much needed sporting, arts, 
cultural, social and environmental 
services to the South African public. 
This funding, it is hoped, will help 
secure a better life for all citizens. 
 One of the criticisms frequently 
made of the post-1994 South African 
government is, however, that their 
commitment to the formulation of 
ambitious, often wide-sweeping, 
development plans are seldom matched 
with an accompanying attention to the 
critical institutional and social 
framework needed successfully to 
implement this policy. 
 As we see in this report, the 
manner in which the National Lottery 
has been run since its inception in 2000 
lends much weight to this criticism. 
Most damming of all, perhaps, is the fact 
that, whilst the National Lottery was set 
up with relative ease, it took government 
a full year, and then only after 
widespread public criticism, to begin to 
set up three of the four key Distribution 
Agencies charged with disbursing the 
proceeds of ticket sales to good causes. 
Furthermore, barely half of the money 
available for distribution has actually 
been distributed. This represents a 
complete disregard for the necessary 
institutional and social factors needed to 
make legislation work, and is, sadly, 
indicative of the increasing inability of 
the South African government to match 
its social commitments with actual 
delivery. 
 
THE NATIONAL LOTTERY – 
OVERVIEW 
 The National Lottery Act (57 of 
1997) makes provision for the operation 
of a countrywide lottery. The National 
Lottery was founded in 1999. The Lotto, 
its flagship, was launched on March 2 
the following year. On October 23, 
2000, scratch cards were launched. The 
purpose of this report is to overview 
some of the key issues relating to the 
operation of the Lottery, particularly the 
distribution of money to good causes, 
and to highlight areas of particular 
concern to the non-profit sector. 
 At the outset, it must be stated 
that the report is intended to highlight a 
broad array of issues, raised primarily by 
non-profit organizations themselves. 
Clearly, the sector includes a variety of 
different organisations with different 
organising styles, bureaucratic and 
administrative concerns, and fundraising 
capacities. Expectations of the National 
Lottery differ widely, particularly 
between the larger, non-governmental 
organisations, and smaller, often 
unregistered, community-based 
organisations. Many non-profit 
organisations were beneficiaries of 
earlier scratch card gaming operations, 
and the sudden loss of this source of 
revenue means that their perceptions of 
the National Lottery are motivated by 
quite different concerns to those 
expressed by organisations applying for 
lottery funding for the first time. 
 The report can do no more than 
highlight the variety of perceptions, 
without making judgements as to the 
most appropriate strategies for reform or 
mobilisation around the Lottery. That is 
the task of the non-profit sector. 
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Two time-periods should be born in 
mind. Uthingo Management Company 
Pty (Ltd) has been granted a licence to 
operate the Lottery for seven years, 
starting in 2000. During this period, 
incremental reforms rather than dramatic 
change are possible, particularly with 
regards to the structure and operation of 
the Distribution Agencies. After this 
period has ended, however, new 
regulations will have to be drafted, and a 
new tender process will be embarked 
upon. In anticipation of this, the non-
profit sector should seek to make 
maximum input into the debate as to the 
most appropriate terms and conditions 
for the second licence period. 
In Part One, some background to the 
National Lottery is offered. This 
includes the establishment of the 
Lottery, as well as the functions, 
responsibilities, and performance of the 
main players: Uthingo, the Lotteries 
Board, the Distribution Agencies, etc. A 
very brief overview of the Lotto and 
scratch card operations is also provided.  
 Whilst Part One is largely 
descriptive, Part Two considers some of 
the criticism that has been levelled 
against the National Lottery, as well as 
the perceptions of three categories of 
role-players: the loosely defined non-
profit sector; parliament/government; 
and the Lotteries Board itself.  
 It must be emphasised that, to 
adopt the phrase used by one informant, 
some of the criticism offered is valid, 
some is based on misinformation, and 
some of it is simply sour grapes. It is 
hoped that this report might contribute in 
some small way towards sifting out the 
valid criticism and using this in a 
constructive way to contribute to the 
development of the National Lottery. 
 
 
PART ONE: BACKGROUND TO 
THE NATIONAL LOTTERY 
 
 With the curious exception of the 
lucrative horse racing industry, betting 
on sports events, or gambling in any 
form, was illegal in South Africa prior to 
the democratic reforms in 1994. 
Gambling was, however, allowed in the 
nominally independent “homeland” 
states, which gave rise to a flourishing 
casino business. 
 Despite these prohibitions, 
underground gaming operations began to 
appear in the 1990s. At the same time, a 
variety of scratch card gaming 
operations were launched, which were 
used to help fund worthy causes. The 
Community Chest, Ithuba, and Viva, 
were all involved in these latter 
operations, and raised millions of rands 
for beneficiary organisations. 
 After the elections in 1994, the 
new government was charged with the 
task of managing the burgeoning 
underground gambling industry. To this 
end, a variety of government inquiries, 
including the Howard Commission and 
the Lotteries and Gambling Board, under 
the chairpersonship of Professor Nic 
Wiehahn, were conducted to inform 
government policy. The Gambling 
Board proposed that government 
acknowledge gambling as a “social 
reality”, and seek to regulate the industry 
and ensure that some of the profits from 
gambling are used to benefit the poor.  
 The gambling industry was also 
identified as an area where black 
economic empowerment could actively 
be championed. This principle informed 
the licensing of legal casinos (now 
restricted to a total of 40), as well as the 
tender to run the National Lottery. 
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In order to promote a culture of 
“responsible gambling”, the South 
African Advisory Council on 
Responsible Gambling (SAACREG) 
was established, composed of 
representatives from civil society and the 
gambling industry.1 
 Two organisations have primary 
responsibility for the National Lottery: 
the licensed Operator, that runs the 
Lottery itself, and the National Lotteries 
Board, which is responsible for 
overseeing the Lottery and looking after 
the interests of all parties concerned. 
Added to this we need to pay particular 
attention to the Distribution Agencies, 
which are appointed by the Minister but 
are, in effect, run by the Lotteries Board. 
These latter are responsible for the 
distribution of the good cause money. 
 
1.1 THE LICENSED OPERTOR: 
UTHINGO MANAGEMENT 
(PTY) LTD 
 Three consortia bid for the 
licence to run the first South African 
National Lottery. The preferred bidder 
was Uthingo Management (Pty) Ltd, a 
consortium formed in 1996 composed of 
a variety of South African black 
economic empowerment partners, 
industry shareholders, and, 
controversially, state shareholders.2 
 The three “industry 
shareholders” bring considerable 
experience of the gaming industry to the 
consortium, and together own 30% of 
Uthingo. The shareholders are Camelot 
International, which operates the UK 
Lottery; Tattersalls, with a background 
in the Australian gaming industry; and 
GTECH, a gaming industry and online 
service provider. 
 The black economic 
empowerment partners own 50% of 
Uthingo, and control 80% of seats on the 
board. The partners are: the Black 
Management Forum Investment Co (Pty) 
Ltd (10%); the Disability Employment 
Concerns Trust (5%); Motswedi 
Technology Group (Pty) Limited (10%); 
NAFCOC Investment Holding Co Ltd 
(10%); NUMSA Investment Co (Pty) 
Ltd (10%); WDB Investment Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd (5%) 
 The two State shareholders are 
the National Empowerment Fund (5%) 
and the South African Post Office 
(15%).  
 The Chief Executive Officer of 
Uthingo is Humphrey Khoza. The 
current Chairperson is Dr. Barney 
Pityana. 
 As the Operator, Uthingo is 
responsible for the establishment and 
management of a national 
communications network, the selection, 
licensing and training of retailers, and all 
associated marketing activities. 
Although Uthingo is not responsible for 
the distribution of money to good 
causes, it has set up its own charity, the 
Uthingo Trust. The Trust invests in 
small-scale community projects, 
particularly programmes aimed at the 
youth, women, the disabled, and Aids 
orphans.3 The Uthingo Trust functions 
like any major social investment 
programme, and does not warrant 
particular attention in this report. 
 
1.2 GAMING OPERATIONS 
 The flagship of the National 
Lottery, the Lotto, was launched by 
President Mbeki at Yeye Butchery in 
Langa on March 2, 2000. At the launch, 
Mbeki predicted that the National 
Lottery would raise R13 billion for good 
causes within five years. 
 A second gaming operation, the 
scratch cards, was launched on October 
23, 2000. Currently nine variations of 
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this game are on the market, namely Pot 
of Gold (R3), Pocket Money (R2), Cash 
Explosion (R5), Money Spinner (R3), 
Going for Gold (R5), Treasure Chest 
(R3), Banco (R3), Money magic (R2), 
and Goal (R2).4 
 The draw for the winning 
numbers is held each Wednesday and 
Saturday on the television show 
Road2Riches, which has become the 
second most watched programme on 
national television. The programme is 
associated with the widely known catch 
phrase, Tata Ma Chance, Tata ’Ma 
Millions, which, depending on one’s 
perspective, is either a stroke of 
marketing genius or a thinly veiled ploy 
to stimulate false hopes amongst the 
poor and despondent. 
 By the 1st July 2002, the gross 
sales of the Lotto were R8,884,390,136.5 
No accurate figures are available for 
gross sales of scratch cards, but this has 
been estimated as R542,225,724 for the 
same period. Together, this amounts to 
an (estimated) total sales of 
R9,426,615,860. 
 Over the duration of the seven 
year licence, an average of 30% of all 
ticket sales after VAT is designated for 
good causes. Although only a fraction of 
this has been disbursed so far, this 
money will become available in the 
immediate future, and is thus a 
significant source of finance for 
charities, arts, sporting and other non-
profit organisations. 
 
1.3 THE NATIONAL LOTTERIES 
BOARD 
 The National Lotteries Board is a 
statutory body established in terms of the 
Lotteries Act (57 of 1997).  The Board is  
 
 
responsible for the regulation of all 
lotteries conducted in South Africa, 
including the National Lottery, as well 
as other private and society lotteries. 
 The Board is made up of public 
nominees, at least four of whom are 
outside government service, and is 
chaired by Joe Foster. Although the 
Board reports annually to parliament, it 
operates independently.  
 In addition to ensuring that the 
National Lottery and all other lotteries 
are conducted “with due propriety”, the 
Lotteries Board has three other duties 
that are of particular concern here, 
namely: 
 
• to protect the interests of all 
participants, 
• to maximise the net proceeds of the 
National Lottery, and 
• to ensure that a percentage of money 
from ticket sales is transferred to the 
National Lottery Distribution Trust 
Fund (NLDTF) and administered and 
invested in terms of the Lotteries 
Act.6 
 It is important to emphasise that 
the Lotteries Board understands the 
phrase “all participants” to imply that 
they are accountable only to ticket 
holders,7 and not to non-profit 
organisations applying for funding from 
the national Lottery. 
 This is an area where further 
debate should occur. It is not 
unreasonably to assume that all three of 
these duties go beyond a narrow, 
bureaucratic mandate, and imply a 
substantial degree of accountability to 
both the general public and the intended 
beneficiaries of the good cause money. 
This is discussed in more detail in 2.1.2. 
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1.4 THE NATIONAL LOTTERY 
DISTRIBTION TRUST FUND 
(NLDTF) 
 The money raised through the 
sales of Lotto tickets and scratch card, 
after VAT, is distributed according to 
the following formula:8 
 
• 50% – goes to prizes 
• 20 % – goes to the licensee 
(Uthingo) 
• 30% – distributed to good causes 
(National Lottery Distribution Trust 
Fund) 
 
 The 20% awarded to the licensee 
is divided further into two categories, 
namely: 
 
• 15% – which goes to the licensee 
(Uthingo) 
• 5% – which goes to the various 
distribution outlets and vendors 
 
 Whilst many commentators have 
been quick to criticise Uthingo for 
making huge profits out of the Lottery,9 
this formula was agreed upon by 
parliament, and is part of the contract 
entered into with the operator. 
Moreover, in-so-far as the Operator 
makes its profits by maximising overall 
ticket sales, they are also increasing the 
share transferred to good causes. There 
is little to be gained in criticising the 
Operator for making a profit!  
 30% of ticket sales, after VAT, 
are thus intended for good causes. This 
money constitutes the National Lottery 
Distribution Trust Fund, which is 
established and monitored – but, as we 
suggest below, need not necessarily be 
administered directly – by the National 
Lotteries Board. The money is 
transferred to the NLDTF on a weekly 
basis,10 whilst the distribution of these 
funds takes place on an annual basis. 
 No more than 10% of the money 
awarded to the National Lottery 
Distribution Trust Fund for distribution 
to good causes – i.e. no more than 3% of 
the total proceeds from ticket sales – is 
allowed to be used for administration. 
The Lottery Board is proud of its ability 
to administer the Fund within such tight 
financial parameters, and claims that 
their overhead costs are considerably 
lower than those levied by earlier 
lottery-funded grant-making 
organisations. 
 One question that might be 
considered when considering the terms 
and conditions for the second licensee 
(i.e. after 2007) is whether the amount 
stipulated for good causes should remain 
at 30%, and whether this amount should 
include the expenses of the Lotteries 
Board. 
 
1.5 THE DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
 The Lotteries Act prescribes the 
purposes to which funds invested in the 
NLDTF can be used by distinguishing 
five categories within which good causes 
money is to be allocated. The categories 
are: 
 
• The Reconstruction and 
Development Programme, 
• Charities, 
• Arts, Culture and National 
Heritage, 
• Sport and Recreation, and 
• Miscellaneous Purposes. 
 
 The Act stipulates that a 
minimum of 10% of the total funds are to 
be allocated to the first four of these 
categories, and a maximum of 5% to the 
Miscellaneous Purposes category. 
Should the demand for funds 
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administered by the four primary 
categories exceed this statutory floor, the 
Distribution Agency responsible can 
approach the Minister of Trade and 
Industry and motivate for an additional 
allocation. 
 The Lotteries Board has 
sometimes come under criticism for 
allocating money to sporting and cultural 
bodies at the expense of the poor.11 
Whatever the merits of this claim, it is 
important to emphasise that it is the 
Lotteries Act that determines these broad 
parameters. It is a decision taken by 
parliament, not by individual members 
of the Lotteries Board or by the Minister 
of Trade and Industry.  
 The decision to stipulate only 
minimal levels of support for each of the 
four primary categories was taken in 
order to give the Minister of Trade and 
Industry the discretion to respond to 
changing sectoral needs. Prior to the 
introduction of the Lottery, no one knew 
with any certainty what type of 
organisations would apply for funds, and 
it was felt that by stipulating only 
minimal levels it would be possible to 
satisfy the competing need for multi-
sectoral funding (Arts, Culture, Sport, 
Development, etc.) and to respond more 
innovatively to demands from the 
ground up.12 As we see below, the 
Charities category has received the 
greatest share of the overall allocation to 
date. 
 The Department of Trade and 
Industry has indicated that it will use the 
experience learnt through the first seven 
years of funding applications to further 
develop the principles informing 
allocation.13 The non-profit sector must 
seek to influence this learning process. 
 
 
1.6 THE DISTRIBUTION 
AGENCIES 
 The decision as to which 
organisations are to receive funding is 
the responsibility of the nominated 
Members of the Distribution Agencies. 
 Two-and-a-half years after the 
start of the National Lottery, only three 
of the four key Distribution Agencies 
have been established. Moreover, these 
Agencies were only established a year 
after the first Lotto tickets were sold, 
and then only in the face of severe 
criticism from the general public and 
parliament. The Agencies remain 
severely understaffed, and it is clear that 
the attention given to the profit-making 
side of the gaming industry has not been 
matched by an equal commitment to 
maximise the quite enormous benefits 
that this industry offers to the Arts, 
Sports, and Charities-Welfare sectors.  
 The Agencies established so far 
are the Charities; Arts, Culture and 
National Heritage; and Sport and 
Redistribution Agencies. Members of 
these Agencies were appointed by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry on 
February 1 2001. 
 The procedures for dispersing 
funds allocated to the RDP and 
Miscellaneous Purposes categories are 
still under review, and it is not clear 
when, if at all, a decision will be taken 
as to their future. At present, and in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
Act, these categories are administered by 
the Minister of Trade and Industry. 
 Unfortunately, no accurate, up-
to-date distribution figures exist. The 
best available information is presented in 
some detail in Appendix A: 
Distributions to date.  
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As these figures show, there is a 
considerable amount of money that has 
yet to be distributed: approximately half 
of the total money available in 2001-
2002. Unfortunately, it is not clear how 
much of this was carried over from the 
first round of distribution (up until 31 
March 2001), and how much of this 
stems from the second round of 
distribution (up until 31 March 2002).  
 As such, it is impossible to 
speculate as to whether the distribution 
process has become more effective as 
the Agencies grow in experience, or 
whether the Agencies have become less 
effective in the face of rapidly increasing 
sums of money. 
 
1.6.1 The miscellaneous category 
 The Miscellaneous category is 
intended for “emergency funding”. The 
Minister of Trade and Industry, in 
consultation with the Minister of 
Finance, has discretion as to how these 
funds are to be used.14 
 Comparatively little money has 
been allocated from this category so far. 
Between December 2000 and January 
2001, in response to a public outcry 
regarding the slow pace of allocation,15 
emergency funding of just over R4.1 
million was allocated to 80 organisations 
which had benefited previously from the 
scratch card operations run by Ithuba 
and the Community Chest. 
 Between 1 April 2001 and 31 
March 2002, R21.96 million was 
transferred to the Miscellaneous 
category of the NLDTF. None of this 
money was disbursed, and it (and the 
interest it accumulates) is available for 
distribution. 
 There is considerable debate 
within the Lottery Board as to the best 
way to use this money.16 This is an area 
where potentially meaningful lobbying 
might take place, especially given the 
size of undistributed funds.17 
 Many people have suggested that 
the idea of a general emergency and 
discretionary category, subject to a 
statutory funding ceiling (currently 5%), 
is a good one, and should be supported. 
Initial concerns that this would be used 
arbitrarily or for overtly political reasons 
– as was the case in the UK, for 
example, with money allocated for 
Millennium celebrations – do not appear 
to have been warranted, although 
whether this is due to the inability of the 
Ministry to spend money or a credit to 
responsibly manner in which the 
Minister administers the fund remains to 
be seen. 
 
1.6.2 The Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) 
category 
 Of all the categories, the RDP 
category poses the greatest dilemma for  
the National Lotteries Board. The 
category reflects the concerns of 
parliament in 1997 when the Act was 
passed. The abandonment of the 
Reconstruction and Development 
Programme means that there is no longer 
any clear basis upon which allocation 
decisions might be made, and the 
category appears to be superfluous.18 
 With the abandonment of the 
Reconstruction and Development 
Programme, the Minister of Finance is 
supposed to identify a fund into which 
money from the RDP category is paid.19 
Although the idea of transferring money 
to the NDA has been mooted, no 
decisions have yet been taken.20  
 To date, no funds have been 
allocated from the RDP category, and a 
total of R63.92 million is available for 
distribution.21  
 The Lotteries Board is working  
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with the Ministers of Finance and Trade 
and Industry to develop a policy for 
dispensing the RDP money. As with the 
Miscellaneous category, this is an area 
where potentially meaningful lobbying 
might take place. 
 
1.6.3 The Charities Distribution 
Agency 
 The Charities Distribution 
Agency is responsible for guiding the 
allocations made to the broadly defined 
charity and welfare sector, and is 
appointed by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, in consultation with the 
Minister responsible for welfare and 
population development.22 Ten 
members23 were appointed on 1 
February 2001, one of whom has since 
resigned, ostensibly because of his 
frustration with the way in which the 
Agency is operating.24 
 A request to speak directly with 
the Agency members was declined by 
the Lotteries Board.25 As such, it has not 
been possible officially to canvass their 
views on operation of the Agency and 
the distribution to date. 
 The initial focus of the Charities 
Distribution Agency was directed at 
“organisations serving the needs of 
children, the youth, socially vulnerable 
groups (e.g. elderly, women, and 
disabled) and people living with 
HIV/AIDS.” Controversially (see the 
discussion in Part Two of the Report), 
this was subject to the clause that 
“Organisations had to demonstrate that 
they faced the risk of scaling down or 
closure if not assisted.”26 This later 
consideration meant that members of the 
Board were given little freedom to assess 
the merits of project-based proposals, 
and were instead directed by the 
Minister to take decisions simply on the 
basis of urgent financial need. This all 
but excluded from consideration any 
applicant with reserve funding or 
investments of its own, regardless of the 
type of service they provided,27 and flew 
in the face of government’s general 
insistence that non-profit organisations 
put measures in place to help secure 
their sustainability. 
 Based on the experiences gained, 
as well as discussions within the Agency 
itself, the criteria were changed 
somewhat for the 2002-2003 funding 
cycle. Here the focus was placed on:28 
• capacity building for organisations 
and communities which will involve 
training; advocacy and lobbying; and 
skills development, 
• poverty alleviation, and 
• community and residential care for 
the vulnerable, i.e. children, families, 
older persons, persons with 
disabilities, women, people 
affected/infected by HIV/AIDS, the 
chronically ill, youth, and drug 
abusers and offenders. 
 One significant criticism of the 
earlier funding approach is that by 
expecting applicants to be registered 
non-profit organisations with audited 
financial statements, many innovative 
and effective community based 
organisations were excluded.  
 The latest funding criteria seek to 
broaden the pool of potential applicants 
by “requesting” non-profit organisations 
to enter into a “formal working 
relationship” with unregistered 
community-based organisations, and to 
assist these organisations to apply for 
and to help administer this money should 
the application be successful. Non-profit 
organisations are entitled to include in 
their funding applications the costs 
incurred in such partnerships, although 
the Lotteries Board has expressed 
concern about the “unrealistic” nature of 
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many of the budgeted claims.29 No 
guidelines to govern this intended 
cooperation have been provided. 
 To date, the Charities 
Distribution Agency has been allocated 
the lion’s share of the NLDTF money. In 
2000-2001, a total of R44.2 million was 
distributed. 
 In the 2001-2002 funding cycle, 
this rose to R103.28 million, out of an 
available R154.7 million. 
 
1.6.4 The Sport and Recreation 
Distribution Agency 
 The Sport and Recreation 
Distribution Agency is responsible for 
overseeing and guiding the allocations 
made to the sports and recreation sector, 
and is appointed by the Minister of 
Trade and Industry in consultation with 
the Minister responsible for sport and 
recreation.30 Five members31 were 
appointed on 1 Feb 2001. 
 Much criticism has been levelled 
against the Lottery for funding sports at 
the expense of charities, or, as one critic 
suggested, for “Robbing the Helpless to 
help footballers.”32 Clearly, this raises 
important “macro” issues relating to the 
purpose of the NLDTF and the types of 
causes it should support. Should the 
Lottery be used to fund a cross section of 
good causes, including the arts and 
sporting worlds? Or should funding be 
restricted to priority developmental 
welfare targets? Or should some sort of 
balance between the demands of these 
sectors be sought? This report can do no 
more than flag this “macro” question: it 
is the responsibility of all organisations 
and interested parties to develop their 
own answers to this. 
 At the same time, it is important 
to put the allocations to “non-welfare” 
organisations into the context of the laws 
governing the National Lottery. Thus it 
must be remembered that the minimum 
allocations (10%) given to Arts and 
Sports are determined by law, not by the 
Minister, the Lotteries Board, or the 
Distribution Agencies. It is only when 
amounts in excess of this “statutory 
floor” are claimed that the Minister’s 
discretion becomes important.  
 The criteria for priority funding 
in the Sports category have not changed 
since the initial round of funding 
applications. Emphasis is placed on the 
provision of equipment for and the 
renovation and upgrading of existing 
infrastructure, as well as capacity 
building in sport. Applications for new 
infrastructure are not considered.33 
 This stress on infrastructure and 
capacity development is understood as 
an empowerment exercise. Thus, in 
response to public criticism of the large 
sums of money allocated to sporting 
bodies like the Blue Bulls Rugby Union 
(R1.15 million in 2000-2001),34 the 
Lotteries Board is quick to point out that 
this money was allocated specifically to 
the upgrading of stadiums in six under 
serviced areas, and that none of this goes 
to the Blue Bulls rugby team.35 
Ironically, the decision – which is 
perfectly legitimate and in keeping with 
the brief of the Arts Distribution Agency 
– to award R1 million to the Cape Town 
opera has not been widely criticised.36 
 In the 2000-2001 funding cycle, 
a total of just over R20.2 million was 
allocated. 
 In the 2001-2002 funding cycle, 
the total amount disbursed was R71.66 
million, out of an available R99.3 
million. 
 
1.6.5 The Arts, Culture and National 
Heritage Distribution Agency 
 The Arts, Culture and National 
Heritage Distribution Agency is 
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responsible for overseeing and guiding 
the allocations made to this sector, and is 
appointed by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry in conjunction with the 
Ministers responsible for arts, culture, 
science and technology, and 
environmental affairs.37 Twelve 
members were appointed on 1 Feb 
2001.38 
 Within this category, three sub-
sectors have been identified, namely, the 
Arts, Heritage (both Cultural and 
Natural), and Environment, each of 
which has its own qualifying criteria.  
 Although the focus of the report 
is the Charities Agency, this Agency 
should be born in mind as it overlaps 
with many of the concerns of the 
developmental and welfare sectors. 
Indeed, some organisations have found 
that their areas of interest overlap. In one 
case, a decision was made to apply to 
this Agency on the assumption that there 
would be less competition for funds.39 
 In the current (2002-2003) round 
of funding, the category is open to a 
wide range of funding applications. 
Preference is however given to proposals 
that promote job creation, skills transfer, 
equity and redress of historic 
imbalances, and Nation building.40  
 Within the Arts sub-category, 
both major project funding applications 
and creative development grants will be 
considered. In addition, applications 
from festival organisers, organisations 
involved in the production of films and 
documentaries, organisations involved in 
public art, and grants to projects in the 
rural areas. 
 Within the Heritage sub-
category, three priority areas are 
identified:  
 
• Architectural, archaeological and 
living heritage conservation 
• Indigenous knowledge systems 
• Historical and cultural research and 
surveys 
 
Four preferential focus areas are 
identified for the Environment sub-
sector, namely: 
 
• Biodiversity in conservation and eco-
development 
• Anti-pollution and anti-degradation 
of the environment 
• Temporary relief from disasters and 
the prevention of erosion of the 
environment 
• Regeneration of effected 
environments 
 
 In the 2000-2001 funding year, a 
total or R9.8 million was dispersed 
under the Arts, Culture and national 
Heritage category.  
 In the 2001-2002 funding year, 
this had increased dramatically to R48 
million, out of an available R99.3 
million.  
 
1 .7 DETERMINING THE TOTAL 
ALLOCATION 
 Due to the significant roll out 
costs involved in establishing the 
National Lottery, the Operator is not 
expected to be able to pay out 30% on 
all ticket sales immediately. Instead, the 
percentage given to good causes is only 
expected to average out at 30% over a 
seven year period. Thus, contributions 
are expected to rise from 10.16% in year 
one of the contract to 40.58% in year 
seven. 
 There is, however, some 
uncertainty as to how this “averaging 
out” has been determined. Whilst the 
first and last years percentages have 
been announced publicly,41 it is not clear 
whether fixed percentages for each of 
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the seven years have been determined ex 
ante, or whether the Operator (Uthingo) 
has the discretion to adjust these within 
the limits imposed by the 30% average 
disbursement clause. Moreover, it is not 
clear what, if any, sanctions can be 
imposed if the yearly targets are not met. 
 The significance of this is as 
follows: if the Operator has the 
discretion to make only minimal 
payments to the NLDTF until well into 
the contract, then, in effect, considerable 
amounts of interest free loan capital have 
been made available. Some have 
speculated that, given the current 
percentage payments made to the 
NLDTF, this amounts to R200-R300 
million per year.42 
 This arrangement could well be 
permissible under the terms of the 
contract entered into with Uthingo, and 
there is no reason to suspect that 
anything untoward is occurring. 
However, in the interests of 
transparency, it is vital that this issue be 
clarified publicly.  
 Attempts to get hold of a copy of 
the contract from Uthingo, the National 
Lotteries Board, or the Department of 
Trade and Industry, all failed. Brian 
Bailey, who has produced the most 
comprehensive financial analysis of the 
Lottery to date, was similarly 
unsuccessful in his attempts to get hold 
of the contract. The reason stated for this 
failure to disclose information is that (a) 
Uthingo is a private company, and 
cannot therefore be compelled to reveal 
information, and (b) making details of 
the contract public would give Uthingo’s 
competitors access to privileged 
information when competing for the 
license to operate the 2007 Lottery.43 
 
 
 
1.7.1 Gross sales, prizes, and good 
cause determination 
 Based on figures released by 
Uthingo, as well as extrapolations based 
on the published average weekly Lotto 
and scratch card sales, Brian Bailey of 
the Helderberg Society for the Aged has 
prepared the summary analysis on page 
15.44 The figures should be treated as 
provisional only. There is still no 
reliable information for the total good 
cause allocation. Of great concern are 
the huge amounts of money available to 
good causes that have yet to be 
disbursed. 
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Summary Analysis    
All amounts in rand LOTTERY SCRATCH TOTALS 
    CARDS LOTTERY & 
2-Jul-02   ESTIMATE SCRATCH CARDS 
    
    
Gross sales 8,884,390,136 542,225,724 9,426,615,860 
VAT paid to State 1,091,065,455 66,589,124 1,157,654,579 
Net sales 7,793,324,681 475,636,600 8,268,961,281 
Prizes paid or allocated  4,002,318,274 237,818,300 4,240,136,574 
Licensee’s fees and profit – 20% 1,558,664,936 95,127,320 1,653,792,256 
Amount for good causes 30% 2,337,997,404 142,690,980 2,480,688,384 
Interest “earned” on “G C” money 395,589,031 13,720,184 409,309,215 
Total to be accounted for 2,733,586,435 156,411,164 2,889,997,599 
    
Paid or allocated to date to Good Causes         301,419,575   301,419,575 
    
The missing amount      2,432,166,860        156,411,164           2,588,578,024  
    
Theoretical allocation    
Charities         820,075,931          46,923,349              866,999,280  
Less allocated        (301,419,575)                      -               (301,419,575) 
         518,656,356          46,923,349              565,579,705  
Arts and culture         820,075,931          46,923,349              866,999,280  
Sport         820,075,931          46,923,349              866,999,280  
Miscellaneous and costs         273,358,644          15,641,116              288,999,760  
Net amount which should be available      2,432,166,862        156,411,163           2,588,578,025  
 
PART TWO: ATTITUDES, 
PERCEPTIONS, HOPES 
 In the second part of the report 
we focus on the perspectives of the 
various role players involved in or 
affected by the National Lottery. As 
stated above, the purpose is primarily to 
highlight issues of concern. In some 
cases, these issues are based on 
misunderstandings that can easily be 
corrected. In other cases, the concerns 
are more serious, and must urgently be 
addressed if the non-profit sector wishes 
to obtain maximum benefits from the 
Lottery. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 PERCEPTIONS OF THE 
LOTTO: CIVIL SOCITY, THE 
LOTTERIES BOARD, 
GOVERNMENT 
 Social perceptions, whilst 
subjective and often difficult to quantify, 
are an important determinant of the 
success or failure of all government 
initiatives. Perceptions are especially 
important to the success of the National 
Lottery, especially in light of the huge 
public interest in both the gaming 
operations and the distribution of monies 
to good causes. 
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In order to unpack the views of 
stakeholders, a number of small, 
medium and large non-profit 
organisations in the charities, sporting 
and cultural sectors were consulted.45 
This was supplemented with interviews 
with representatives of parliament, the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and 
the National Lotteries Board. 
 
2.1.1 Those pesky applicants: The 
Lotteries Board and the non-
profit sector 
 At the outset, it must be noted 
that the report is unable to offer any 
substantial insight into the day-to-day 
operations of the Lotteries Board. For a 
variety of reasons, the Board operates in 
a relatively non-transparent manner. 
Very little information is provided to the 
public regarding the amount of money 
available for distribution, or the 
procedures involved in the distribution 
process. Although two annual reports 
have been published, these do not satisfy 
the public demand for accountability, 
and this reluctance to communicate 
openly and proactively is largely 
responsible for the considerable feelings 
of mistrust encountered in the non-profit 
sector. Although the Board has promised 
[May 2002] to set up a website which 
releases such information on an ongoing 
basis has been made,46 this has yet to be 
honoured. 
 Much of this ill-feeling is 
attributed to the attitude of the staff at 
the Lotteries Board. One informant 
described this as a “siege mentality,” 
whereby the Board has responded to 
public criticism by closing ranks and 
treating all queries and correspondence 
as an attempt to undermine their powers. 
Although much of this ill feeling can be 
traced back to the public outcry over the 
Agencies initial hesitance to disburse 
funds, it is hardly constructive to the 
proper administration and utilisation of 
money raised through the Lottery. 
 The Lotteries Board has also 
been criticised for treating the money 
raised for good causes as a state 
resource, to be dispensed as a privilege, 
as opposed to something that can 
rightfully be claimed by non-profit 
organisations providing services to the 
poor, or addressing social, cultural and 
sporting needs that the state is unable to 
fund. In opposition to this, many 
organisations consulted felt that the non-
profit sector has a right to feel entitled to 
this money. That is why the National 
Lottery was established, and why the 
Lotteries Board is given responsibility 
for maximising the amount of money 
available to the NLDTF. 
 The Lotteries Board is aware of 
such criticism, and has chosen to restrict 
all contact with the general public to the 
occasional press release and interviews 
with its Player Services Media Liaison 
Officer. On one level, this is 
understandable, and there are good 
reasons why certain Board and 
Distribution Agency members are 
“shielded” from the public. The success 
of the allocation process depends on the 
ability of the Board to make 
independent, objective decisions. Were 
the public and hopeful applicants 
allowed to communicate directly with 
Agency members, this process would be 
seriously jeopardised. As such, some of 
the criticism regarding the Board’s 
reluctance to discuss specific 
applications needs to be contextualised. 
Certainly, Distribution Agency members 
appear to be grateful for the fact that 
they are able to operate in a confidential, 
private manner, and believe that the 
increased protection offered by the 
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Player Services Media Liaison Office is 
a good thing.47 
 Whilst accepting the need to 
limit certain forms of communication, 
the public and potential applicants have 
a right to expect greater transparency 
from a Board that is established by Act 
of parliament. If for this reason alone, it 
is important that the Lotteries Board 
improve its relationship with the sectors 
and interest groups it is supposed to 
serve. Ideally, the Board should seek 
actively to encourage a healthy, ongoing 
relationship with the non-profit sector, 
and develop a common vision as to how 
the proceeds of the Lottery should be 
distributed. If this were to occur, the 
non-profit sector and the state would, in 
partnership, be able to leverage 
potentially enormous amounts of money 
and utilise this in a focussed and 
constructive manner. 
 For as long as an “us” and 
“them” attitude prevails, there can be 
little hope of this occurring.  
 
2.1.2 Accountable: to whom? 
 The Board believes that its job is 
to ensure that the commercial aspects of 
the Lottery are conducted within the 
parameters of the legislation and that the 
Operator is held to public account. As 
Sershan Naidoo, the Player Services 
Media Liaison Manager points out, no 
one buys a ticket because a portion of 
this money goes to “good causes.”48 
People buy tickets because they hope to 
win prizes and it is the Lotteries Board’s 
job to ensure that the interests of such 
“players” are protected. This, it must be 
said, is in keeping with the definition of 
a “participant” in the Lotteries Act, i.e., 
“a person … in possession of a valid 
ticket in the lottery”.49 Players must be 
protected, and this is a statutory 
responsibility of the Board.  
 Whilst it is correct to highlight 
this responsibility to ticket holders, this 
seems an unduly restrictive manner in 
which to define the accountability of the 
Board. The intention in establishing the 
National Lottery was more than simply 
to regulate the booming underground 
gaming industry. Instead, the Lottery 
was understood as a means to raise and 
direct money to good causes that might 
not otherwise receive sufficient support 
from the state or the private sector. 
Accordingly, as noted in 1.3 above, it is 
instructive that the Lotteries Act defines 
one of the tasks of the Board as ensuring 
that “the net proceeds of the National 
Lottery are as large as possible.”50 
Clearly, this suggests that the Board’s 
accountability goes beyond a simple 
legal accountability to ticket holders, as 
the purpose of maximising net proceeds 
is to ensure that greater amounts of 
money are available to good causes via 
the National Lottery Distribution Trust 
Fund (NLDTF). Maximising this is as 
important as ensuring that the Lottery is 
conducted in a way that is fair to all 
“participants”. 
 Other responsibilities identified 
by the Act reinforce this broader 
conception of accountability. These 
include the establishment and regulation 
of the NLDTF, as well as widely 
construed advisory functions. In 
particular, the Board is directed to advise 
the Minister on matters such as the 
percentage of money (over and above 
the statutory minimum) allocated to each 
distribution category,51 the “efficiency” 
of legislation “pertaining to lotteries and 
ancillary matters”52, and the 
establishment and implementation of “a 
social responsibility programme in 
respect of lotteries”53. 
 If it is true that the Board’s 
responsibilities implies that it is 
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accountable to both players and the 
broader public, then this widens the 
parameters within which lobby groups 
can pressurise the Minister and the 
Lotteries Board. Higher percentages may 
be awarded to some categories, as long 
as these remain above the statutory 
minimum. (In practice, this is already 
occurring).  
 On the positive side, the Board 
acknowledges a need to improve its 
communication strategies, and has 
promised [20 May, 2002] to place 
posters at all 8,000 Lotto stations listing 
the 1,240 recipients of Lottery funding. 
The poster is to be sponsored (R35,000) 
by ABSA bank, and will not be paid for 
out of money demarcated for good cause 
allocation. In addition, the Board has 
promised to start a web site providing 
up-to-date information on the allocation 
process.  
 Although there is, as yet, not 
evidence of either promise having been 
kept, such moves are to be welcomed, 
and are, hopefully, suggestive of an 
attitudinal shift of attitude within the 
Board.  
 
2.1.3 The Lotteries Board – 
Professionalism and 
consistency 
 Another very widely shared view 
is that applications for funding are not 
dealt with in a professional and 
consistent way. To a significant extent, 
this attitude is born out of the 
circumstances in which the Distribution 
Agencies were constituted. As noted 
above, the Agencies were only 
established a year after the inception of 
the National Lottery. Prior to this, little 
or no thought seems to have gone into 
how the money would be distributed, 
and what principles would govern 
distribution. The call for public 
nominations to the Distribution Agencies 
was cursory, at best, and there has not 
been an open public debate as to how the 
money raised through the Lottery should 
be distributed. 
 Applications submitted to the 
Distribution Agency are not always 
acknowledged, and frequently get lost. 
When organisations attempt to find what 
has happened to their applications, they 
complain of being passed from one 
person to another. Perhaps most 
significantly, decisions by the 
Distribution Agencies are never 
explained. Unsuccessful applicants 
receive cursory, one-line letters, in 
which they are informed of the Agency’s 
decision and invited to re-apply next 
year. Some applications are partially 
funded, but no explanations are offered 
as to why this is the case, or even as to 
what part of the proposal the money is 
intended. 
 The Lotteries Board 
acknowledges that its decision not to 
provide reasons for the success or failure 
of funding applications was an error, and 
have promised [20 May, 2002] to do so 
with the current (2002-2003) round of 
applications. 54 As with other related 
promises, there is no evidence to suggest 
that the Board is able to honour this 
commitment, and recent rejection letters 
continue simply to inform applicants that 
they “did not meet the criteria.”  
 This failure to explain why or 
how decisions are reached helps 
reinforce a more general concern with 
the consistency of decisions taken. For 
example, there is considerable 
unhappiness amongst the welfare sector 
about the fact that some organisations 
had their applications for funding turned 
down on the basis that they had financial 
reserves or Trust funds, and were thus 
not in danger of immediate closure, 
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whilst other organisations with financial 
reserves were granted funding.  
 This perception may well be 
incorrect, and there could be a good 
reason why the decision not to fund 
organisations with financial reserves was 
not applied consistently. Once again, if 
there was greater transparency in the 
way the Agencies operated, and if the 
reason for funding decisions was 
explained to all applicants, then this 
concern may well be addressed. 
 In order to function in a 
consistent and transparent fashion, it is 
vital that the Board change its attitude to 
the non-profit sector it serves. To do 
this, it is clear that the administrative 
capacity of the Distribution Agencies 
will have to be enhanced considerably. 
In theory, staff members at the Central 
Distribution Agency are expected to 
perform most of the legwork, sifting 
through and pre-screening applications, 
and presenting these to the nominated 
representatives for each category.  
 In practice, staff shortages at the 
Lotteries Board, as well as a lack of 
sector-specific skills, mean that the 
members of the public nominated to 
each of the Agencies have had to take on 
board a huge administrative role. In the 
first round of emergency applications, 
for example, Agency members in the 
charities sector went through all of the 
3,000 applications themselves. This is a 
complete waste of their time, and makes 
nonsense of the Lotteries Board’s claim 
to have established a viable and 
professional distribution system.  
 
2.1.4 The loss of funding from 
alternative (scratch card) 
gaming operations 
 The nationalisation of the lottery 
meant that a variety of earlier gaming  
operations, for example, those run by the 
Community Chest, Viva and Ithuba 
Trusts, were forced either to close down 
or to compete under very different 
circumstances. Many beneficiaries of 
these operations were affected badly, 
and have been forced to scale back their 
operations until alternative sources of 
funding can be located. According to Joe 
Foster, chairperson of the Lotteries 
Board, these regulations are intended to 
protect the public from dishonest 
fundraisers and scratch card operations, 
rather than unduly to restrict the capacity 
of organisations to raise their own 
funds.55 One of the functions of the 
Lotteries Board is to monitor and ensure 
that organisations register with the 
Board, and comply with its regulations. 
 Some non-profit organisations 
have dismissed this as nothing more than 
an attempt to protect the monopoly 
enjoyed by the National Lottery. Others 
have suggested that the requirements 
governing the operation of these lotteries 
are too onerous, especially regarding 
prize money, making it very difficult for 
non-profit organisations to raise funds 
via their own lotteries. 
 Recent amendments to the 
provisions governing society lotteries 
make it possible for organisations to 
continue to raise up to R12 million 
annually. Several non-profit 
organisations, notably the Nelson 
Mandela Children=s Fund, the South 
African Blind Workers= Organisation, 
the Cotlands Baby Sanctuary, the 
National Thoroughbred Trust, and the 
Variety Trust, have registered with the 
National Lotteries Board to legally 
conduct society lotteries.56 Although this 
is an encouraging start, the viability of 
society lotteries has yet to be 
demonstrated, and it remains to be seen  
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whether the domestic gaming market is 
large enough to allow any small lottery 
to compete with the National Lottery. 
 For their part, the Lotteries Board 
and the Department of Trade and 
Industry are adamant that there is 
sufficient space for society lotteries to 
compete, and to raise additional funds 
for the non-profit sector. Moreover, they 
claim that the former beneficiaries of 
scratch card operations have exaggerated 
greatly the extent of their dependence on 
these funding sources, and that they are 
already receiving Lottery grants vastly in 
excess of any funding they received 
from the old scratch card operations. 
There is some substance to this point: In 
one case known to the author of this 
report, an organisation that is 
particularly critical of the National 
Lottery has just received a grant exactly 
ten times that which it used to receive 
from the Community Chest.57 
 In summary: it is important to 
note that there is a very strong sense 
within the welfare and development 
sector that the former scratch card and 
gaming operators who lost out as a result 
of the National Lottery should be 
compensated for the reduction in their 
revenues.  
 
2.1.5 Relationship between the 
Distribution Agencies and the 
Lotteries Board (1): Excluding 
civil society and existing grant 
makers? 
 The decision to make the 
National Lotteries Board responsible for 
the distribution of funding has come 
under criticism in some quarters. The 
South African National NGO Coalition, 
for example, cites this as “another 
example of the contempt with which 
Government, and in particular the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, views 
the non-governmental sector.”58 In 
response, SANCOCO, in conjunction 
with the Non-profit Partnership, have 
developed an alternative proposal for an 
independent Charities Distribution 
Agency.59 This was submitted to the 
Lotteries Board as well as the Minister 
of Trade and Industry, but was never 
acknowledged officially.  
 The Board is not sympathetic to 
such criticism. When asked about the 
SANGOCO/NPP proposal, they pointed 
out that these organisations “basically 
wanted to become the Distribution 
Agency” and that “The Act does not 
allow this. People, not organisations, 
make up the Agency.”60  
 From a legal perspective, this 
attitude is understandable. The Act is 
clearly concerned to ensure the 
independence of the distribution process 
and, for this reason, places considerable 
emphasis on the need to ensure that 
neither parliament nor any particular 
organisation or lobby group is able to 
exert undue influence on the Distribution 
Agencies.61 Clearly, this precludes the 
possibility of any organisation becoming 
a Distribution Agency. At the same time, 
it raises the question as to whether the 
Lotteries Board – which, quite clearly, is 
an organ of state62 – should be able to 
influence the day-to-day operation of the 
Distribution Agencies. This is explored 
in more detail in the section that follows. 
 The Lotteries Board is no less 
sympathetic to calls that they utilise the 
experience of existing grant-makers. 
Their mandate, the Board insists, is to 
fund organisations and projects, not 
funders. In particular, the Board points 
out that the total amount of money 
allocated by Viva and the Community 
Chest combined was only R30 million a 
year, and that these organisations are 
simply not equipped to handle the R430 
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million which is currently available to 
the Distribution Agencies.63 
 This response is not entirely 
convincing. The question is not whether 
the Community Chest and other grant 
makers take responsibility for 
distributing all available funds, but, 
rather, whether the task of distributing 
the NLDTF to good causes could be 
performed more efficiently if the 
extensive regional networks and grant 
making expertise of existing funding 
conduits could be employed. 
 One of the criticisms often 
levelled against the Distribution 
Agencies is that they lack an “on the 
ground” presence in any of the three key 
sectors or categories in which they 
operate. Although Agency staff do 
sometimes visit applicants, this is done 
infrequently and on an inconsistent 
basis.64 This shortcoming is exacerbated 
by the fact that the Board sits in Pretoria, 
which removes it further from the 
disparate communities seeking support. 
 One way to avoid this 
shortcoming may be to decentralise the 
Distribution process. Provincial or 
perhaps Regional Distribution Agencies 
would be far more efficient, in that they 
would be responsible for considering 
fewer claims, and would have a far 
greater understanding of local dynamics. 
Applications could still be pre-screened 
by the Central Distribution Agency in 
Pretoria to ensure general compliance 
with the funding criteria, whilst more 
conceptual decisions as to the 
appropriateness of funding applications 
would be taken at a Provincial level. In 
regions or Provinces where existing 
grant makers and funding conduits exist, 
these could play an active role in 
assisting the Provincial Distribution 
Agencies. 
 When approached about this, the 
spokesperson for the Minister of Trade 
and Industry, Mr Edwin Smith, 
confirmed that the DTI was willing to 
consider proposals to decentralise some 
of the decisions pertaining to allocation. 
As long as the decision making-powers 
remain with the Board, there does not 
appear to be any reasons why this should 
not involve some form of consultation 
with existing grant-making 
organisations.65 
 
2.1.6 Relationship between the 
Distribution Agencies and the 
Lotteries Board (2): A conflict 
of interest? 
 From a legal perspective, it is not 
certain whether the Board is entitled to 
play a direct role in the process of 
allocation, whilst having at the same 
time responsibility for regulating this 
same process. A referee cannot 
ordinarily be a player in the same game 
that she is overseeing! 
 Legal opinion on this relationship 
is being sought, and will be integrated 
into the report as soon as it is available. 
At face value it is fair to suggest that the 
close operational relationship between 
the Board and the Distribution Agencies 
makes it difficult for these latter to 
function as an arms-length policing 
mechanism. In the UK, by contrast, 
considerable effort has been made to 
distinguish the bodies responsible for 
policy formation and regulation from the 
bodies responsible for overseeing the 
allocation process. 
 The Lotteries Board does not 
believe this relationship is cause for 
concern. As they put it: 
The National Lotteries Board has been 
charged by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry to set up and manage the  
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Central Applications Office. This is the 
office that offers administrative support 
to the Distributing Agencies. The 
Agencies have been appointed by the 
Minister DTI. In term of the Lotteries 
Act, the Agencies, together with the 
NLB and the Minister are responsible 
for policy formulation. It is the function 
of the Agencies to  then adjudicate the 
applications. The Board, as trustee of 
the NLDTF, oversees the distribution of 
funds and reports on this to Parliament 
in the Annual Report of the NLDTF. 
The Agencies report to the Board at a 
frequency determined by the Board.66 
 
2.1.7 What sort of applications 
should be funded? 
 Three issues need to be raised 
here. Firstly, the question of whether 
funding should be short-term and project 
based, or whether funding should be 
available for longer-term projects and 
core organisational expenses as well. At 
present, funding is geared exclusively 
towards the former. However, given the 
stated intention of the National Lottery 
to introduce a degree of financial 
stability and predictability into the non-
profit sector,67 a call for longer-term 
funding would appear appropriate.  
 One way to structure this would 
be to introduce a dual distribution 
system, whereby applications could be 
made for annual expenditure, typically 
focussed on a specific project, or for a 
longer-term combination of project and 
core organisational funding. As the 
licence to run the National Lottery is 
granted for a seven year period, such 
applications could be for a period of 
three to four years, i.e., half the life of 
the Lottery. The Department of Trade 
and Industry has indicated that it is 
willing to entertain such a request.68 
 Secondly, and related to the 
objective of introducing a degree of 
financial security into the non-profit 
sector, it has been suggested that the 
Lotteries Board identifies a list of 
nominated beneficiaries, who can be 
assured of regular funding. This category 
would include organisations that take on 
long-term funding commitments, for 
example, child welfare organisations 
who are responsible for looking after a 
child for many years. 
 The third issue concerns the 
degree of organisational, administrative 
and financial capacity that can 
legitimately be expected of applicants. 
Presently, applicants are expected to be 
registered organisations, and be in a 
position to furnish (usually three years) 
audited financial statements. Opinions 
on the merits of this vary enormously 
within the sector. For some, this is 
unduly restrictive, as it effectively 
prevents many unregistered community 
based organisations (CBOs) from 
receiving funding, despite the fact that 
many of these organisations are very 
effective at delivering services at 
community level.69 Others are quick to 
point to the poor track record of grants 
administered by CBOs, and are generally 
supportive of the need to ensure 
stringent financial accountability. 
 The Lotteries Board, largely in 
response to criticism from parliament,70 
is attempting to make it easier for CBOs 
to apply for funding. This is seen as an 
adaptation to the changing nature of 
South Africa, and of the developmental 
sector in particular. Thus, according to 
Mr Alister Ruiters, the Director-General 
of Trade and Industry, the principle of 
offering smaller grants to help smaller 
organisations to get started had been 
accepted by the “adjudicating panels” 
[Distribution Agencies], whilst the strict 
requirement that only juristic persons 
[i.e. registered organisations] can apply 
for funding had been relaxed, and is now 
only enforced with larger organisations. 
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Thus, according to Ruiters, a woman 
hoping to start a community crèche can 
now apply on the strength of “a letter 
from a person of standing in the 
community.”71 
  It is not clear whether and to 
what extent this claimed relaxation of 
the rules has actually occurred. 
Moreover, as the stipulation that only 
juristic persons may apply for grants is a 
statutory one,72 it is highly that either the 
Distribution Agencies or the DTI has the 
power to take such a decision. 
 The main way in which the 
Board is able to facilitate broader access 
is by encouraging larger non-profit 
organisations to form partnerships with 
un-registered CBOs. The larger 
organisations will, it is hoped, assist the 
CBOs to improve their financial and 
administrative capacity, and help ensure 
that the funds are administered as 
intended. The CBOs, in turn, will bring 
their close contact with “communities” 
to the partnership. This will improve the 
capacity of both partners to deliver 
services efficiently. Such partnerships 
are meant to foster empowerment 
relationships, and not indefinite 
partnerships.73 
 Whilst supportive of the need to 
broaden funding channels, many larger 
organisations are, understandably, 
concerned about the impact of this shift 
on their operations. Firstly, they are 
concerned about a general tendency for 
Board members (and parliament) to 
make sweeping generalisations about 
what the Chair of the Portfolio 
Committee on Welfare describes 
cursorily as the “eighty percent” of 
organisations that existed “before 
transformation” and which “served 
certain populations.”74  
 Such generalisations about civil 
society organisations point to the paucity 
of information informing decisions taken 
by the Lotteries Board, and by 
parliament. As noted above, the Board 
lacks the capacity to make systematic 
and regular visits to applicants, and to 
audit properly their operations. The 
Board has only five field officers 
(although it hopes to increase this to 
nine75), and operates solely at a national 
level. As such, it is difficult to see how it 
is able to make informed decisions 
regarding the extent to which 
organisations are, or are not, 
“transformed” (whatever that is taken to 
imply); or even to gather meaningful 
information about what the organisation 
applying for funding actually does and  
which interest groups it actually serves.  
 In one case, a senior member of 
the Central Distribution Agency openly 
challenged an applicant about the racial 
composition of its senior management, 
without having any direct contact with 
the organisation.76 Surely it is a 
legitimate expectation that the Board 
requests information about how an 
applicant operates, how efficiently they 
deliver services, what percentage of 
funds go to administration and what 
percentage goes to services, etc., before 
making sweeping statements about 
degrees of “transformation” and political 
acceptability. 
 Whilst the concerns of larger 
more professional organisations are 
valid, it is clearly important to broaden 
the net of potential funding, and the 
decision to allow CBOs to apply for 
funding in partnership with non-profit 
organisations has been received 
positively. It will be interesting to see 
how this evolves over time: what types 
of partnerships are formed, how the 
CBOs benefit from this funding, and 
whether the CBOs are able to use this 
 23 
money to develop into sustainable 
organisations or not. 
 At the same time, it is not clear 
how the larger non-profit organisations 
are to be compensated for entering into 
partnerships with CBOs. The application 
forms makes provision for “reasonable” 
reimbursement for organisational time 
spent in mentoring the CBO, but this is 
an ill-defined term. The Board 
complains that many of the applications 
received to date make vastly inflated 
claims, whilst others have not claimed 
for money at all.77 Again, one will have 
to wait until the next round of funding 
decisions are made before passing 
judgement on the way in which this 
principle is being applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1.8 Provincial – Regional bias of 
allocations 
 The fact that one of the criteria 
for the allocation of funds is the 
provincial distribution of ticket sales is 
often criticised, in that it reinforces 
existing inequalities between the wealthy 
and poor provinces. When this was 
discussed in the Social Development 
Portfolio Committee in October 2001, 
Ms Mamphi went so far as to suggest 
that she “could not believe that 
Parliament had passed legislation which 
perpetuates poverty.”78  
 As the figures below 
demonstrate, this is a valid concern. In 
the financial year ending March 31, the 
distribution was as follows (for full 
details, see Appendix A: Distributions to 
date). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eastern 
Cape 
Free 
State 
Provincial 
Gauteng  14 7
6 5
KwaZulu 
Natal 2
6 Mpumalanga 39
7 North West 
Northern 
Cape 
14
Northern 
Province 
Western 
Cape 
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No comparable figures exist for the 
period thereafter, although the Lotteries 
Board claim to have corrected some of 
these distortions in the allocations made 
during the 1 April 2001 to 31 March 
2002 period.79 
 
3.  CONCLUSION – CRITICAL 
ISSUES 
 This report has done no more than 
flag some of the key issues concerning 
the impact of the National Lottery on the 
non profit sector. It is not intended to be 
prescriptive, but, rather, to provoke 
debate amongst various role players. 
With that in mind, the following four 
points might help focus discussion. 
 
3.1 Empower the Distribution 
Agencies 
  Above all, and regardless of any 
other changes that need to occur, the 
funds available for Distribution need to 
be distributed efficiently and timeously. 
In the 2001-2002 funding cycle, barely 
half (R223 million) of the money 
available for distribution (R439 million) 
was disbursed. This is a national 
disgrace, and cannot be allowed to 
continue. 
  As discussed in 2.1.7 above, the 
Distribution Agencies have only five 
field officers, and are hoping to expand 
this to nine. This is completely 
inadequate. Until sufficient staff and 
resources are allocated to the running of 
the Agencies, this situation is likely to 
get worse, whilst continued increases in 
the total amount of money available in 
the National Lottery Distribution Trust 
Fund are likely further to strain the 
administrative capacity of the Agencies. 
  Finally, the distribution of funds 
from the RDP and Miscellaneous 
categories has, effectively, ground to a 
halt. Urgent decisions have to be made 
as to the future of these categories, and 
as to how the monies accumulated in 
these might be distributed. As an 
emergency measure, the Minister should 
consider using existing grant-makers to 
help disburse funds.  
 
3.2 Decentralise the process of 
allocation 
  There is no reason why all 
decisions pertaining to allocation should 
be taken at a head office level. In the 
UK, the allocation process has been 
decentralised. Decisions regarding 
smaller applications are taken by 
regional staff, and it is only once 
applications cross a certain threshold 
that the central office has to play a role. 
Appropriate accounting procedures 
ensure that the regional offices act 
within the parameters of the law and 
respect budgetary limitations, whilst 
modern computer technology ensures 
that the decentralisation process does not 
entail an unnecessary duplication of 
administrative personnel and resources. 
  In order to do this effectively, it 
is necessary to make a greater 
distinguish between the roles of the 
Lotteries Board and the Distributions 
Agencies. If the former acts as a 
regulator, and oversees the operations of 
a number of independent Distribution 
Agencies – as the Act appears to imply, 
and as is the case in the UK – then it will 
be far easier to disburse funds in an 
efficient and informed manner. This will 
allow the various Distribution Agencies 
to utilise the experience of local and 
provincial organisations, including 
established grant makers, without 
surrendering their own autonomy. 
  By contrast, in South Africa the 
Central Distribution Agency is, to all 
effects and purposes, part of the 
Lotteries Board. In addition to the fact 
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that this may well be in violation of the 
Lotteries Act (57 of 1997), it is also an 
obstacle to the efficient operation of the 
Agencies. Until the Agencies are able to 
operate at arms length from the Lotteries 
Board, and from parliament, it is 
unlikely that they will ever develop the 
hands on expertise and the capacity to 
take independent decisions needed for 
the Lottery to succeed in its objective of 
providing reliable, sustainable, funding 
for the non profit sector. 
 
3.3 A need for transparency 
  The complaint most frequently 
encountered about the Lotteries Board 
remains their perceived lack of 
operational transparency. This stems 
largely from their somewhat 
controversial role in the distribution 
process. Decisions made are seldom, if 
ever, explained, introducing further 
uncertainty into the application process. 
Despite a promise to rectify this in the 
current round of funding applications, 
organisations are still being told that 
their application was turned down 
because they “did not meet the criteria”, 
without even being told why this is the 
case. The fact that neither the Lotteries 
Board (as the regulator) or the 
Distribution Agencies (as the bodies 
responsible for distribution), are able to 
account for their decisions is a serious 
indictment of their commitment to the 
principles of transparent and 
accountable governance. 
 
3.4 Link funding guidelines to a 
medium-term developmental 
agenda 
  At present, there does not appear 
to be any clear developmental agenda 
informing the allocation of funding in 
any of the three core sectors: charities, 
sports, and arts. Instead, funding 
priorities change, making it difficult for 
organisations to anticipate a reliable 
source of medium-term funding.  
Funding is largely short-term (1 year) 
and project-specific. The DTI claims that 
a core objective of the Lottery is to 
ensure that non-profit organisations are 
able to obtain a degree of long-term 
funding security, tied to the seven year 
cycle of each Lottery contract.80 Yet the 
entire nature of the funding process 
seems to preclude this, in that 
applications have to be made annually. 
Moreover, in-so-far as each Distribution 
Agency is free to alter its criteria for 
priority funding annually, organisations 
can (and, in the case of Charities, have 
already) find themselves in a situation 
where they have to “reinvent” 
themselves annually in order to apply for 
funding. 
  Surely some combination of 
longer-term funding, linked to both 
project and organisational funding, and 
shorter-term, project-based funding, 
would offer greater security and 
enhanced opportunities for the non-profit 
sector? 
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APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTIONS TO DATE  
 
 As noted in the body of the report, the figures presented here are based on those 
provided in the annual reports submitted by the Lotteries Board. These offer little detail, 
and do not make it clear how much money was carried over from the first round of 
distribution (up until 31 March 2001) and how much money stems from the second round 
of distribution (up until 31 March 2002).  
 
1.  2000-2001 Allocations81 
The distribution for the period up to 31 March 2001 is as follows:  
 
Province Percentage 
ticket sales 
Miscellaneous 
Purposes * 
Charities Sport & 
Recreation 
Arts, Culture 
& National 
Heritage 
Percentage 
allocated to 
category 
 
100 % of 
emergency 
funding round 
59.6% 27.3% 13.2% 
 
Eastern Cape 7% 
 
R    317 000 
 
 
R  6 001 
178 
 
R  2 509 
800 
 
R  1 495 000 
 
Free State 5% 
 
R    107 000 
 
 
R  2 037 
000 
 
R  1 580 
000 
 
R    440 000 
 
Gauteng * 
 
39% 
 
R 2 425 000 
 
 
R16 783 
000 
 
R  7 074 
078 
 
R    600 000 
 
KwaZulu Natal 14% 
 
R    121 000 
 
 
R  6 718 
408 
 
R  1 351 
000 
 
R 2 819 000 
 
Mpumalanga 7% 
 
R      65 000 
 
 
R     906 
930 
 
R  2 330 
400 
 
R    700 000 
 
North West 6% 
 
- 
 
 
R     915 
678 
 
R       18 
149 
 
R 1 050 000 
 
Northern Cape 2% 
 
R      42 000 
 
 
R  1 311 
800 
 
- 
 
R      95 000 
 
Northern 
Province 
6% 
 
R      90 000 
 
 
R     683 
000 
 
R  2 848 
190 
 
R    871 000 
 
Western Cape 14% 
 
R    935 000 
 
 
R  8 859 
377 
 
R  2 533 
360 
 
R 1 747 000 
 
TOTAL 
 
 
 
R 4,102,000 
 
R 
44,216,371 
 
R 
20,244,977  
 
R 9,817,000 
   R74,278,348 
* These figures include National Bodies based in Gauteng 
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2.  2001-2002 Allocations82 
In the period 1 April 2001 to 31 March 2002, the breakdown was as follows: 
 
Province Percentage 
ticket sales 
RDP Miscellaneous 
Purposes 
Charities Sport & 
Recreation 
Arts, 
Culture & 
National 
Heritage 
Percentage 
(relative to 
total money 
actually 
allocated) 
 Nil Nil 46.3% 32.1% 21.6% 
Percentage 
(relative to 
total money 
available for 
allocation) 
   23.5% 16.3% 11% 
No of 
applications  Nil Nil 2 254 535 742 
No of 
beneficiaries  Nil Nil 851 251 139 
 
R 
63,921,436 
 
R 21,960,708 
 
R 
154,705,387 
 
 
R 
99,313,412 
 
 
R 
99,313,412 
 
Money 
available 
for 
Distribution 
 
R439,214,364 
 
Eastern 
Cape 
n. available Nil Nil R10,287,991 R12,177,635 R3,445,504 
 
Free State n. available Nil Nil R4,404,672 R2,896,583 R987,460 
 
Gauteng** n. available Nil Nil R36,858,077 R18,274,807 R17,012,680 
 
KwaZulu 
Natal 
n. available Nil Nil R15,177,155 R10,862,528 R5,603,360 
 
Mpumalanga n. available Nil Nil R2,400,544 R3,495,400 R400,000 
 
North West n. available Nil Nil R2,143,960 R3,185,276 R2,642,500 
 
Northern 
Cape 
n. available Nil Nil R3,044,865 R3,430,321 R498,247 
 
Limpopo n. available Nil Nil R2,530,900 R5,191,217 R2,971,000 
 
Western 
Cape 
n. available Nil Nil R26,433,111 R12,147,771 R14,535,663 
R103,281,275 
 
R  
71,661,538   
 
R  
48,096,414 
 
 
TOTAL 
 
n. available Nil Nil 
R223,039,227 
• These figures include National Bodies based in Gauteng 
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